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others to jointly attend to the same thing. Adults and infants
are highly sensitive to these gaze cues. Early in life, infants
preferentially attend to faces and face-like stimuli (Farroni,
Csibra, Simion & Johnson, 2002), while in adulthood,
people can rapidly locate faces, even when embedded
among numerous non-face distractors (Hershler, &
Hochstein, 2005). Conversely, irrelevant faces interfere with
locating other non-face objects in a search task (Langton,
Law, Burton, & Schweinberger, 2008).
Beyond simply attracting attention, eyes, hands and faces
can act as cues to distal locations or objects. Pointing, head
turns, and gaze shifts have all been shown to shift attention
toward the cued direction, aiding subsequent detection and
identification of stimuli located there, with only a few
hundred milliseconds’ exposure to the cue (Driver, Davis,
Ricciardelli, Kuhn, & Benson, 2007; Friesen, & Kingstone,
1998; Langton, & Bruce, 1999; Frischen, Bayliss, & Tipper,
2007; Crostella, Carducci, & Aglioti, 2009; Burton,
Bindemann, Langton, Schweinberger, & Jenkins, 2009). In
addition, this effect is resistant to interference, and these
properties have led some to suggest that social cueing is
automatic and stimulus driven. Indeed, this proposal is
consistent with specialized processing of social cues in the
brain, especially in the superior temporal sulcus (Allison,
Puce, & McCarthy, 2000). Nevertheless, this view remains
contentious since there is evidence from other neural
activation studies showing a large degree of overlap
between social and non-social stimuli (Tipper, Handy,
Giesbrecht, & Kingstone, 2008), as well as behavioral
evidence, including but not limited to spatial cueing tasks
showing mixed results in distinguishing between social and
non-social cues (Kuhn, & Benson, 2007; Eimer, 1997;
Friesen, Ristic, & Kingstone, 2004; Tipples, 2002).
Accordingly, exogenous cueing of attention may not be
unique to social stimuli, but rather shared by the broader
class of directionally-oriented stimuli.
If it is true that social stimuli are no different in their
ability to orient attention, what other properties could
explain the differences observed in other tasks? Birmingham
and Kingstone (2009; Birmingham, Bischof, & Kingstone,
2008) suggest that the crucial difference lies in their

Abstract
Social stimuli are a highly salient source of information, and
seem to possess unique qualities that set them apart from
other well-known categories. One characteristic is their ability
to elicit spatial orienting, whereby directional stimuli like eyegaze and pointing gestures act as exogenous cues that trigger
automatic shifts of attention that are difficult to inhibit. This
effect has been extended to non-social stimuli, like arrows,
leading to some uncertainty regarding whether spatial
orienting is specialized for social cues. Using a standard
spatial cueing paradigm, we found evidence that both a
pointing hand and arrow are effective cues, but that the hand
is encoded more quickly, leading to overall faster responses.
We then extended the paradigm to include multiple cues in
order to evaluate congruent vs. incongruent cues. Our results
indicate that faster encoding of the social cue leads to
downstream effects on the allocation of attention resulting in
faster orienting.
Keywords: social cues; spatial cueing; selective attention;
reflexive orienting; exogenous and endogenous attention

Introduction
At a crowded party surrounded by strangers, sharing a
meal with friends, or catching the eye of your server on a
café patio, we cannot help but notice and react to the actions
of those around us. Through the language of glances and
gestures, physical proximity, and facial expressions, we
exchange invitations to interact. Interpreting and sending the
right social cues is a fundamental part of communicating,
building, and maintaining relationships. At the same time,
we are not entirely beholden to the social world around us;
in a crowded coffee shop, we manage to tune others out to
finish our paper draft. The competition between noticing
and engaging with others while completing our own
personal goals is a fundamental question of what influences
our attention and how these endogenous and exogenous
processes interact.
Social cues, and in particular, gaze cues, are seen as
fundamental to communication (Langton, Watt, & Bruce,
2000). For example, direct gaze can be seen as an invitation
to interact, while averted gaze is often used to signal interest
in other objects and may communicate an invitation for
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propensity for attracting, rather than their ability to orient
attention. This argument, however, is incomplete, in that it
fails to explain how the selection process distinguishes
between social and non-social objects. One possibility is
that encoding of the social stimuli occurs more quickly,
allowing those items to compete for attentional resources
sooner. In this light, the design of the standard spatial
cueing paradigm (Posner, 1980) makes observing a
difference less likely, as the presentation of a single, isolated
cue at a known location obviates the need for selective
attention. Furthermore, even if social cues are detected
faster or with greater likelihood, the differences may be
small and obscured by the additional time taken to orient
towards the periphery, detect the target, and plan the
appropriate motor response. Differentiating between the
effects of these multiple component processes is necessary
for identifying if and how social stimuli are different.
We began this investigation by using a standard spatial
cueing paradigm to examine differences in the speed of
detecting and responding to a peripheral target after the
appearance of a non-predictive pointing hand or arrow cue.
It has been argued that hands provide a more salient and
accurate cue than eye gaze or head direction, but have
received significantly less study (Langton et al., 2000;
Ricciardelli, Bricolo, Aglioti, & Chelazzi, 2002). In line
with previous research, we expected faster encoding and
thus shorter reaction times in response to a pointing hand as
compared to an arrow. Moreover, both types of stimuli have
been shown to be effective cues, so we do not expect any
difference in their cueing strength, measured as a validity
effect (invalid – valid RTs).

fingers. Stimuli were presented using E-Prime presentation
software (Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA).
Procedure Each trial began with a central, white fixation
cursor, presented for 400, 500, or 600ms. The fixation
disappeared and was replaced with the central cue, which
remained visible throughout the rest of the trial. After a
delay of either 100 or 600ms, the target appeared in the
periphery and remained on screen until the participant made
a response, or 5 seconds had elapsed. A blank screen was
shown between trials for 600, 700, or 800ms (see Figure 1
for stimulus sizes and arrangement). Subjects were
instructed to fixate on the center of the screen, and to
respond to the location where the target appeared as quickly
and accurately as possible. Additionally, they were informed
that the cues were non-predictive, such that targets were
equally likely to appear at the cued and uncued location

Experiment 1
Methods
Participants were shown a non-predictive hand or arrow
cue and tasked with responding to the location of a
subsequently appearing peripheral target stimulus. The cue
was visible for either 100 or 600ms before the appearance of
the peripheral target. Prior research suggests that shorter
delays tap into automatic or reflexive processes, while a
greater delay permits more volitional or strategic responding
(Friesen et al., 1998). Twenty-two undergraduate
psychology students (11 female, between 18-24 years of
age) participated as volunteers or for course credit. In all
experiments, participants reported normal or corrected to
normal vision and were naive to the purpose of the research.

Figure 1. (a) Trial Procedure (b) Stimulus arrays used in
Experiments 1-3. Sizes and distances visually exaggerated
for clarity; true values shown in degrees of visual angle.
Design Three within-subjects factors were manipulated.
Stimulus type referred to either a pointing hand or an arrow.
The stimulus to target onset asynchrony (SOA) was 100 or
600ms. Validity referred to whether the target would appear
at the location cued by the stimulus (valid) or to the
opposite side of the screen (invalid).
These factors yielded 8 unique trial types, which were
each presented with 20 repeats per block for 3 blocks,
yielding 480 total trials per subject. Within each block, the
direction of the central cue and the location of the target
were counterbalanced for each condition. Before beginning
the experiment, participants completed 16 practice trials and
were provided feedback on their response time and
accuracy. Feedback was not provided during the
experimental trials.
The overall proportion correct was 98.4% across all
participants. Due to the low amount of errors, we only
analyzed correct responses. We also excluded trials with
reaction times less than 100ms or greater than 800ms to

Stimuli and Apparatus The stimuli were comprised of
digital images of either a pointing hand or a flesh colored
arrow created using Adobe AfterEffects CS5 (Adobe
Systems, San Jose, CA), and were presented on a 36.6 x
27cm LCD screen operating at 1024 x 768 pixel resolution.
Participants were seated approximately 70cm from the
screen and responded using the ‘1’ or ‘3’ key on the
computer number pad with their right middle- and index-
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exclude anticipations and inattentive responses, which
accounted for an additional 1.2% of the total trials. A 2x2x2
repeated-measures ANOVA with stimulus type, SOA, and
validity as within-subjects factors was conducted.

both hand and arrow stimuli (i.e., no stimulus effect for the
validity measure) showed no difference. We earlier
proposed that this encoding difference is critical in
explaining how attention can be selectively oriented towards
social stimuli. In order to test this hypothesis, we needed to
increase the difficulty of the task to include multiple cues.

Results & Discussion
Consistent with the results from previous studies, mean
response times to valid trials (387ms) were faster than
invalid trials (401ms), F(1, 21) = 20.18, p < 0.001, 𝜂 2 =
0.490. This result confirms that even though participants
knew that the cues were irrelevant, they could not
completely ignore them.
Response times were also affected by the SOAs. The
600ms SOA produced faster overall responses (375ms) than
the 100ms delay (413ms), F(1, 21) = 191.95, p < 0.001, 𝜂 2
= 0.901. This is likely due to participants having additional
time to prepare a response (Driver, et al. 1999).
We hypothesized that the social nature of the pointing
hand would lead to faster encoding, and thus shorter
reaction times than the arrow. Our results were consistent
with this prediction in that the mean reaction time was faster
to the hand than to the arrow (392 and 397ms respectively),
F(1, 21) = 10.18, p < 0.01, 𝜂 2 = 0.327, though the difference
was small. The interaction between stimulus and SOA was
not significant, F(1,21) = 3.70, p = 0.068, suggesting that
the additional response preparation benefitted both stimulus
types similarly. Plots showing the main effects are shown in
Figure 2.

Experiment 2
White, Ratcliff, and Starns (2011) studied the effect of
surrounding a central cue with flankers on directional
judgments, and suggest that multiple cues can
simultaneously contribute to a directional decision. In this
experiment, we utilized a similar paradigm to explore
whether the addition of flanking stimuli facilitate or
interfere with processing of the central cue.

Methods
Twenty undergraduate psychology students (14 female,
between 18-22 years of age) participated in this experiment
as volunteers or for course credit. Participants reported
normal or corrected to normal vision and were naive to the
purpose of this research.
Stimuli and Apparatus We modified the stimuli from
Experiment 1 by pairing the central cue with two additional
cues of the same type, i.e. three hands arranged horizontally.
The two flankers were always oriented in the same direction
as each other, but could point in the opposite direction of the
central cue. The total horizontal extent of the stimuli
subtended 6.9° visual angle. The distance between the target
and the central cue remained the same as Experiment 1.

Design
As in Experiment 1, we manipulated the stimulus type
(hand vs. arrow), and the SOA between cue and target (100
vs. 600). With the addition of the two flanking cues, validity
was defined as the relationship between the central cue and
the target location. We term the relationship between the
directionality of the flankers and the central stimulus
‘congruence.’ Trials were ‘congruent’ when all three stimuli
pointed in the same direction, and ‘incongruent’ when the
central cue pointed opposite the two flankers. Thus, on a
‘valid, congruent’ trial, all three stimuli pointed toward the
target, while on an ‘invalid, congruent’ trial, none of them
did. Conversely, on a ‘valid, incongruent’ trial, the central
cue alone pointed towards the target location, while on an
‘invalid, incongruent’ trial, only the flankers pointed toward
the target. Again, we emphasize that none of the cues were
predictive of the target location, and subjects were informed
about this property.
The full-factorial design yielded 16 conditions, each of
which was presented 10 times per block, which was
repeated three times for a total of 480 trials. Before
beginning the experiment, participants completed 16
practice trials and were provided feedback on their response
time and accuracy. We excluded incorrect trials (2.4%) and
filtered based on RT (additional 0.6%) of trials.

Figure 2. Reaction time means and standard error shown for
responses in Experiment 1. Main effects of (a) Validity (b)
SOA and (c) Stimulus.
We also tested whether there was a difference between
valid and invalid cues. The size of the validity effect was
calculated as the mean invalid – valid RT. Response times
were analyzed in a 2x2 repeated-measures ANOVA with
stimulus and SOA as within-subjects factors. Critically, the
stimulus type was not significant, F(1, 21) = 0.75, p =
0.396, nor was SOA, F(1, 21) = 0.05, p = 0.826, or the
interaction, F(1, 21) = 0.15, p = 0.706. These results are
consistent with our hypothesis that both cues are equally
effective at shifting attention toward the target for both
automatic (100ms SOA) as well as more intentional (600ms
SOA) responses.
The overall pattern of results was consistent with faster
encoding of the pointing hand, but the cueing strength for
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invalid) will still be observed. By contrast, incongruent
flanking hands should interfere with the central arrow
resulting in a reverse of the validity effect (invalid < valid).

Results & Discussion
In accordance with Experiment 1, subjects responded
faster when the SOA was 600ms (355.8ms) than 100ms
(396.5ms), F(1, 19) = 124.39, p < 0.001, 𝜂 2 = 0.867.
Additionally, the central cue seemed to exhibit a stronger
overall effect than the flankers, as the main effect of validity
was also significant, F(1, 19) = 6.52, p = 0.019, 𝜂 2 = 0.255,
with faster overall RTs for valid trials (374.1ms) than for
invalid (378.5ms). In contrast to Experiment 1, there was no
main effect of stimulus on response times, F(1, 19) = 1.69, p
= 0.209, with reaction times to the hand (375.3ms) nearly
identical to those for the arrow (377.4ms). One explanation
is that the redundant cueing of the flankers facilitated
encoding for both stimulus types, bringing both close to a
floor, or minimum, encoding time.
We expected the flankers to contribute some influence on
orienting beyond the central cue. The interaction of
congruence and validity was significant, F(1, 19) = 64.67, p
< 0.001, 𝜂 2 = 0.773 , indicating that the arrangement of the
flankers influenced response times (see Figure 3).
To better understand the role of the flankers on orienting,
we tested the validity effect. On congruent trials we
observed a mean RT advantage for valid trials of 23ms,
while incongruent trials showed an advantage in the
opposite direction, on average of 14ms, a reversal of 34ms.
These differences were both significantly different from
zero, t(19) = 7.47, p < 0.001, t(19) = -4.80, p < 0.001 for
congruent and incongruent trials respectively. The
incongruent flankers thus not only mitigated the cueing
effect of the central stimulus, but actually exerted a greater
influence and shifted attention to the opposite side. This is a
critical finding because it indicates that, while located away
from participants’ point of gaze, the two flanking stimuli
were attended and exerted a greater net influence on
orienting than the central cue. Lastly, the interaction of
congruence with stimulus type was not significant, F(1, 19)
= 1.84, p = 0.191, suggesting the strength of the cues was
the same for both types of stimulus.
The greater cueing strength provided by the redundant
cues appears to have created a floor effect and eliminated
the stimulus specific effects seen in Experiment 1. To test
our critical hypothesis, that encoding speed differences will
predict differential allocation of attention towards social vs.
non-social stimuli when the two are present simultaneously,
we modified the current paradigm by placing hands and
arrows together in the same stimulus array.

Methods
The procedure and design for Experiment 3 was identical
to Experiment 2 with one exception; rather than showing
three of the same stimuli, we included hands and arrows
within the same display. The flankers were always pairs of
the same class (e.g. two arrows or two hands) and matched
with a central cue from the other class (e.g. hands flanking a
single arrow or vice versa). Overall error percentages were
low (0.5% of trials) and filtering based on reaction times
excluded another 1.1% of trials.

Results & Discussion
In line with the previous experiments, we observed a main
effect of SOA, F(1, 19) = 296.79, p < 0.001, 𝜂 2 = 0.940
with longer SOAs showing faster responses, and a main
effect of validity, F(1, 19) = 30.67, p < 0.001, 𝜂 2 = 0.617,
with valid responses overall faster than invalid.
Our main prediction was that the flankers would produce
different effects depending on the stimulus arrangement.
When the arrows flanked the hand, we expected them to
have a smaller effect than when the hands flanked the
arrows. For congruent stimuli, the addition of the flankers
should bolster the validity effect. This was the case: the
addition of congruent hand flankers provided a bigger boost
to the central arrow (21ms) than the congruent arrows
provided the central hand (14ms). When all three stimuli
were hands the validity effect was larger (Experiment 2;
22.3ms) than when the flankers were arrows (Experiment 3;
14ms), though a post-hoc t-test showed no significant
difference, t(38) = 1.85, p = 0.073 (two-tailed).
Even more striking are the results from the incongruent
condition. When the hands and arrows provided conflicting
information, targets in the direction cued by the hand(s)
always led to faster response times, regardless of whether
they were placed in the center or appeared as flankers. This
effect is visible as a 10ms reversal of the validity effect
between centrally presented hands and arrows (see the blue
bars in Figure 4). Consistent with these results, the
interaction between stimulus and congruence was
significant, F(1, 19) = 5.24, p < 0.05, 𝜂 2 = 0.216.
Together, these results suggest that the pointing hand
stimuli automatically drew attention at the expense of
attention towards the arrows. The asymmetry of the
flankers’ influence is best understood in terms of faster
encoding of the hands as compared to the arrows. This
initial difference during encoding resulted in a cascading
effect, leading to faster responses to targets cued by the
direction of the hands.

Experiment 3
In the preceding experiment, flankers modulated the
directional influence of the central cue when all three
stimuli were from the same class. In this experiment, we test
the critical prediction of the selection hypothesis: when
presented with both social and non-social stimuli, attention
should be biased towards processing the social cues as the
result of faster encoding. Specifically, we predict that
incongruent flanking arrows will not significantly interfere
with a central hand, and thus a validity effect (valid <
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the predicted distributions for each stimulus configuration
are shown in Figure 5.

Figure 5. Output from the salience algorithm (Harel at
2006) showing the feature-based prediction of
distribution of attention and flanker-to-central ratios for
four stimulus configurations used in Experiment 3.
Congruent, Arrow: 1.33 (b) Incongruent, Arrow: 1.42
Congruent, Hand: 1.57 (d) Incongruent, Hand: 1.37.

Figure 3. Validity effect (Invalid – Valid reaction times) for
response times in Experiment 2. Here we show the main
effect of Stimulus and lack of interaction of the Stimulus
type with Congruence.

al.,
the
the
(a)
(c)

General Discussion
In Experiment 1, we showed that the pointing hands
generated faster overall response times, but saw no
difference in the magnitude of the validity effect. These
results are in line with faster encoding of the social cue, but
no difference in speed of orienting. We modified the basic
paradigm in Experiment 2 to include flankers from the same
stimulus type as the central cue. The presence of the
flankers modulated the effect of the central cue on both
congruent and incongruent trials, suggesting simultaneous
processing of all three stimuli. Moreover, their presence
eliminated the stimulus differences in Experiment 1, which
suggests that the redundant cues facilitated encoding of both
the hands and arrows. Finally, in Experiment 3, we
leveraged participants’ ability to process multiple cues to pit
pointing hands and arrows against one another. We found
evidence suggesting that participants’ faster encoding of the
hand stimuli resulted in preferential attention towards the
hands, and ultimately a greater influence on subsequent
orienting.
Previous research has brought to light important
differences in the way we attend and process social stimuli,
but has struggled to disentangle the multitude of component
processes that contribute to the observed results. Our
findings are consistent with the position put forth by
Birmingham and Kingstone (2009) which proposes that
social stimuli preferentially attract attention. Moreover, we
suggest this preference emerges as a downstream effect of
early encoding differences.
The competing explanation, that the differences between
social and non-social stimuli lie in the speed of orienting,
was not supported. The validity effect provides a measure of
the strength of the stimulus cue for covertly orienting
attention. The size of the validity effect was no different

Figure 4. Validity effect for response times in Experiment 3,
showing the interaction between Stimulus and Congruence.
Note the label on the x-axis refers to the central stimulus
which was always paired with flankers from the other class.
One alternative explanation for the differences in
Experiment 3 is that the stimuli differed on low-level
features like contrast or spatial frequency. In order to
address this question, we utilized a computational salience
algorithm (Harel, Koch, & Perona, 2006) to compute a
feature-based prediction of attention for each stimulus array.
To rule out a featural bias towards the flankers, we
calculated the ratio of the total salience on the flankers
relative to the central cue. These ratios did not correlate with
the size of the validity effect, p = 0.982, suggesting any lowlevel changes were insufficient to account for the changes
we saw. Flanker to central ratios and graphical depictions of
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between the hands and arrows in either Experiment 1 or
Experiment 2. Only in Experiment 3, when the two stimuli
competed for attention, did we see a stronger validity effect
in favor of the hands on both congruent and incongruent
trials. These results are most parsimoniously explained by
faster encoding of the directionality of the pointing hands,
without positing the additional effect of orienting
differences.
An alternative account of the observed difference between
the hand and arrow is via low level features like spatial
contrast. We employed one algorithm and found no
relationship between the computed salience of the stimuli
and participants’ relative attention towards the central and
flanking cues. However, a number of limitations preclude us
from completely ruling out this account. This algorithm was
designed to estimate where subjects would fixate during an
extended, free viewing paradigm, and our stimuli occupied a
relatively small region of the screen subtending only about
7° of visual angle. Subjects were instructed to attend to the
preceding fixation cursor and knew the location of the
stimulus array, so it is reasonable to assume their point of
gaze was directed towards the stimuli. This approach thus
only provides an account of how attention may have been
distributed across the multiple stimuli during the first
fixation. To better distinguish between category and featurebased accounts, future experiments should directly
manipulate low level properties as in the work of Sui,
Rotshtein, and Humphreys (2013).

Farroni, T., Csibra, G., Simion, F., Johnson, M. H. (2002).
Eye contact detection in humans from birth. Proceedings
of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States
of America, 99(14), 9602-9605.
Friesen, C. K., & Kingstone, A. (1998). The eyes have it!
Reflexive orienting is triggered by nonpredictive gaze.
Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 5(3), 490–495.
Friesen, C. K., Ristic, J., & Kingstone, A. (2004).
Attentional effects of counterpredictive gaze and arrow
cues. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human
Perception and Performance, 30, 319–329.
Frischen, A., Bayliss, A. P., & Tipper, S. P. (2007). Gaze
cueing of attention: visual attention, social cognition, and
individual differences. Psychological Bulletin, 133(4),
694–724.
Harel, J., Koch, C., & Perona, P. (2006). Graph-Based
Visual Saliency. Proceedings of the Neural Information
Processing Systems (NIPS).
Hershler, O., & Hochstein, S. (2005). At first sight: a highlevel pop out effect for faces. Vision Research, 45(13),
1707–24.
Kuhn, G., & Benson, V. (2007). The influence of eye-gaze
and arrow pointing distractor cues on voluntary eye
movements. Perception & Psychophysics, 69(6), 966–
971.
Langton, S. R. H., & Bruce, V. (1999). Reflexive Visual
Orienting in Response to the Social Attention of Others.
Visual Cognition, 6(5), 541–567.
Langton, S. R. H., Watt, R. J., & Bruce, V. (2000). Do the
eyes have it? Cues to the direction of social attention.
Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 4(2), 50-59.
Langton, S. R. H., Law, A. S., Burton, A. M., &
Schweinberger, S. R. (2008). Attention capture by faces.
Cognition, 107(1), 330–342.
Posner, M. I. (1980). Orienting of attention. Quarterly
Journal of Experimental Psychology, 32, 3–25.
Ricciardelli, P., Bricolo, E., Aglioti, S. M., & Chelazzi, L.
(2002). My eyes want to look where your eyes are
looking: exploring the tendency to imitate another
individual’s gaze. Neuroreport, 13(17), 2259-2264.
Sui, J., Rotshtein, P., Humphreys, G. W. (2013). Coupling
social attention to the self forms a network for personal
significant. Proceedings of the National Academy of
Sciences, 110(19), 7607-7612.
Tipper, C. M., Handy, T. C., Giesbrecht, B., & Kingstone,
A. (2008). Brain responses to biological relevance.
Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 20(5), 879–91.
Tipples, J. (2002). Eye gaze is not unique: automatic
orienting in response to uninformative arrows.
Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 9(2), 314-318.
White, C. N., Ratcliff, R., & Starns, J. J. (2011). Diffusion
models of the flanker task: discrete versus gradual
attentional selection. Cognitive Psychology, 63(4), 210–
38.

References
Allison, T., Puce, A., & McCarthy, G. (2000). Social
perception from visual cues: role of the STS regions.
Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 4(7), 267–278.
Birmingham, E., Bischof, W.F., & Kingstone, A. (2008).
Gaze selection in complex social scenes. Visual
Cognition, 16(2/3), 341-355.
Birmingham, E., & Kingstone, A. (2009). Human social
attention: A new look at past, present, and future
investigations. Annals of the New York Academy of
Sciences, 1156, 118–40.
Burton, A. M., Bindemann, M., Langton, S. R. H.,
Schweinberger, S. R., & Jenkins, R. (2009). Gaze
perception requires focused attention: evidence from an
interference task. Journal of Experimental Psychology.
Human Perception and Performance, 35(1), 108–18.
Crostella, F., Carducci, F., & Aglioti, S. M. (2009).
Reflexive social attention is mapped according to
effector-specific reference systems. Experimental Brain
Research, 197(2), 143–51.
Driver, J., Davis, G., Ricciardelli, P., Kidd, P., Maxwell, E.,
& Baron-Cohen, S. (1999). Gaze perception triggers
reflexive visuospatial orienting. Visual Cognition, 6(5),
509–540.
Eimer, M. (1997). Uninformative symbolic cues may bias
visual-spatial
attention:
Behavioural
and
electrophysiological evidence. Biological Psychiatry, 46,
67–71.

941

